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Since the end of the Cold War, the principle naval 
powers of East Asia--China, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea--have increased the importance they attach to their 
maritime strategies relative to the changing situation in 
East Asia and adjoining waters.  With the growing reliance 
on each of these countries on seaborne trade and suppl y of 
resources, including oil, the countries' maritime defense 
policies, including the sea lanes of communications 
(SLOCs), are more important than ever.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to explore the maritime visions of these three 
countries, the changing maritime security environment they 
address the maritime territorial disputes, in which they 
are engaged and the potential for a naval arms race in East 
Asia.  It assesses the impact of Korean reunification and 
Chinese reunification on their maritime strategies and 
prospects for a regional multilateral maritime security 
regime.  This thesis emphasizes the importance of the U.S. 
Navy’s forward presence in stabilizing potential problems 
at sea in East Asia. 
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This thesis examines the manner in which the 
established East Asian navies, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), Japan, and Republic of Korea (ROK), approach 
the issue of maritime security in East Asia.  It treats 
their general orientation towards the sea, the immediate 
sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), the post-Cold War 
maritime order in East Asia, changes in general naval 
strategy, international legal changes to the regional 
maritime order, territorial conflicts in the region, the 
South China Sea dispute, and the potential for a naval arms 
race in East Asia.  
The navies of China, Japan, and South Korea all share 
the dream of blue-water operations.  However, East Asian 
maritime security is constrained by international political 
outlooks, as is the case in Japan, the fear of an arms race 
in China, and smaller scale funding as in South Korea, 
especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  None 
of the three leading East Asian navies possesses combatants 
larger than a destroyer, therefore limiting their range of 
operations to the immediate area without logistic support.  
The East Asia navies are fleets of working-class ships.  
None of the navies has high cost, upper echelon naval 
combatants such as cruisers or carriers for protracted 
employment.  The East Asian navies, therefore, are in no 
danger of approaching the bloated Churchillian "luxury 
fleet" status of battleship fleets like the Kreigsmarine 
exiting the Kiel Canal during World War I. 
  x 
The East Asian naval powers envision their respective 
fleets as power projection instruments to protect commerce 
and energy flows.  All are in different stages of 
development.  Japan clearly possesses the ability to patrol 
its extended SLOCs.  China and South Korea focus on 
immediate contingencies in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula 
respectively.  However, the PRC and ROK are actively 
pursuing long-range capabilities at sea to protect national 
interests such as the flow of energy products and sea-based 
resources.  Both are in position to push their maritime 
roles outward to the extended SLOCs.  China in particular 
is working to extend its maritime reach using its limited 
naval resources in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia.  
The East Asian navies therefore are at a turning point 
in expanding their capabilities in extending their reach 
over the extended SLOCs.  The East Asian navies are clearly 
not competitive as much as they are complementary in 
preserving the status quo in the immediate region.  The 
United States Navy will continue to be relied upon as the 
extended reach for China, Japan, and South Korea’s maritime 
interests outside of East and Southeast Asia.  The East 
Asian navies and their development are all rich with 
potential, but they still lack the capability to enforce 
long-range SLOC security without the United States Navy.  
In the end, the balance among the East Asian naval powers 
in protecting their immediate areas of interest in the 
region complements the United States Navy’s vision of 
security while preventing the rise of a regional power.  
The economic focus of these countries - the PRC, Japan, and 
South Korea - ensures the ability of the United States to 
  xi 
remain the predominant power in East Asian maritime 
security.   
Changes in the maritime environment in East Asia since 
the end of the post-Cold War have enhanced insecurity 
rather than stability.  The UNCLOS, though well 
intentioned, has had multiple impacts including rearranging 
the maritime borders of nations and creating new conflicts 
over resources in and below the ocean.  Conflicts over the 
islands of East Asia, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
and Tokdo/Takeshima islands, were exacerbated by 
international law.  Conflicting claims in the South China 
Sea added instability to the maritime regime of East Asia 
and potentially disrupting energy flows from the Middle 
East.  These disputes go hand in hand with emerging 
exploration for non-living resources in East Asia, 
particularly energy resources.      
The transport of energy from the Middle East aided in 
the rise of East Asia economically, but at the same time it 
exposes a weak link that could potentially crip ple the 
vibrant economies of East Asia in similar fashion to the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  Expansion of the PLAN, 
JMSDF, and ROKN southward will only serve to alarm each 
nation with respect to its energy security.  China’s 
maritime assertiveness would serve only to strengthen the 
JMSDF and ROKN and vice versa.  The size of fleets, 
maritime visions, changes in international regimes, and 
energy demands drive the three navies to look outward, but 
economic, political and historic tensions pull them inward.  
Given these forces, continued U.S. Navy protection of the 
  xii 
extended East Asian SLOCs seems the only viable answer, at 
a high cost to the United States.     
The United States makes a point to remain outside of 
the debate over disputed islands in East Asia.  American 
distancing policy in the South China Sea and 
Tokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes lends 
welcome consistency in maritime foreign policy beneficial 
for East Asia.  In all likelihood, the situation will 
remain static, but strained.  The disputed territories are 
largely ignored in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea.  
However, the South China Sea remains the most salient 
flashpoint pertinent to the security interests of East 
Asia.  With respect to this disputed sea, above all else, 
Washington endorses freedom of navigation.  This policy of 
ambivalence but continued presence in East Asian waters 
aids the U.S. security goal of preserving the flow of 
commerce.  Engaging the regional navies in East and 
Southeast Asia over the issues of the South China Sea 
remains the best solution to this potential maritime choke 
point.       
East Asian navies overwhelmingly continue to procure 
cost effective vessels, especially destroyers and 
submarines.  Augmented with land-based patrol, fighter, and 
strike aircraft, these navies rely almost exclusively upon 
these ships to carry out the mission in the immediate 
vicinity of their countries.  Compared with previous naval 
arms races, the East Asian navies are not building vessels 
at a high volume rate with appreciable power projection 
capabilities.  Instead, they are procuring vessels to meet 
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limited goals and in most cases are not building ships to 
counter one another, a classic behavior of arms races. 
The United States must continue to engage the region’s 
navies given the importance of East Asia economically to 
America.  The procurement of naval arms by Japan and South 
Korea is seen in favorable terms because of the systems are 
indigenously produced and of American origin.  The slow 
expansion outward of the JMSDF and ROKN alleviates need for 
an enlarged American presence in the region and allows the 
United States to concentrate on new initiatives in the 
region and elsewhere in the War on Terrorism.  China’s 
naval growth must be watched closely and carefully.  The 
acquisition of Russian systems changes the balance of power 
of East Asian maritime security, but not inexorably.   
East Asia’s navies continue to increase in size, but 
retain a limited scope of activities.  The low rate of 
warship production and types of vessels under construction 
are not indicative of a rising arms race.  On the contrary, 
East Asia’s navies complement each other in the ability to 
protect the SLOCs of the region by the regional operations 
and restraint in further construction.            
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the manner in which the 
established East Asian navies—those of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and Republic of Korea 
(ROK)--approach the issue of maritime security in East 
Asia.  It will treat their general orientation towards the 
sea, the immediate Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), the 
post-Cold War maritime order in East Asia, changes in 
general naval strategy, international legal changes to the 
regional maritime order, territorial conflicts in the 
region, the South China Sea dispute, and the potential for 
a naval arms race in East Asia.  
The research for this thesis is drawn from both 
primary and secondary sources.  The latter consist of 
books, professional and academic periodicals, and internet 
resources relevant to the developing security situation in 
the region.     
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION TO THE US 
The growing importance of trade from East Asia and the 
potential for conflict over territory, resources aiding 
development of the region, and the impact on the SLOCs 
provide the United States with a long-term security policy 
question deserving considerable attention.  Forward 
deployed American forces in the region provide security and 
stability far beyond short-term contingency resolution and 
need to be considered for long-term prosperity.  The 
question of maritime security in East Asia exceeds the 
importance it has garnered in recent government reviews, 
such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and strategic 
  2 
pronouncements in its current and potential importance to 
the United States economically and militarily.  
B. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter II introduces the underlying maritime 
strategies serving each nation’s broader foreign policy 
vision.  It deals with the emergence of maritime factors in 
trade and prosperity of the respective countries.  In China 
and South Korea’s case, it deals with the immediate 
possible contingencies of conflict facing the countries 
with Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula respectively.  
Japan, on the other hand, possesses a Maritime Self Defense 
Force constrained by Japan’s foreign policy legacy to a 
certain extent, although it is now operating beyond its 
traditional bounds in the war on terrorism. 
Chapter III deals with the evolution of the maritime 
order in East Asia’s post-Cold War context.  In particular, 
it examines the concept of sea lanes of communication 
(SLOCs) and their relevance to the maritime situation in 
East Asia.  Primarily, how important are the SLOCs and how 
viable is their defense by the local navies without the aid 
of the United States Navy?  Additionally, the thesis 
examines the significance of SLOCs to energy, food, and raw 
materials imports to the aforementioned countries and their 
interlocking nature.  The issue of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and territorial 
disputes at sea, largely over resources known and unknown, 
in East Asia is also be examined in this chapter.   
Chapter IV looks into the dynamics of the disputes in 
East Asia in the South China Sea, the maritime flashpoint 
most likely to influence East Asia.  It examines how each 
  3 
government involved contends with its own claims and those 
of other nations, but will concentrate heavily on the 
Chinese vantage point.  Additionally, it focuses on the 
U.S. approach to handling disputes in the South China Sea 
and its interests in the unimpeded flow of commerce through 
the area.   
Chapter V examines the buildup of naval arms in East 
Asia.  The increase in naval arms procurement in the region 
can be seen as reflecting anxieties about of an uncertain 
multipolar order following the Cold War.  Some argue that 
the problem is self-initiated and a vicious cycle.  This 
thesis explores the question of whether naval arms 
procurement in East Asia is a function of national maritime 
strategic visions or some other factors.     
Chapter VI synthesizes how the factors of national 
maritime strategies, changes in the post-Cold War maritime 
regime, territorial disputes, and naval arms buildup in 
East Asia bear on the overall nature of the East Asian 
maritime order.   
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II. STRATEGIC MARITIME VISIONS OF EAST ASIAN 
NATIONS 
Assessing the strategic visions and forces that drive 
China, Japan, and South Korea is important in determining 
the drive behind these nations’ decisions to build 
increasingly powerful navies.  Evaluating the maritime 
strategies of these three aforementioned countries with 
respect to their complementary or competitive aspects also 
serves as important indicator of the potential for conflict 
in a region where no multilateral security framework 
exists.  In each of the three cases, there are immediate 
possibilities for contingencies (Taiwan and Korea) that 
drive each country in developing its maritime defense 
strategies.  Other directions in maritime security are 
impelled by long-term perceptions of threat and strategic 
priority.       
A. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
1. Chinese Maritime Tradition 
Long a continental power, China’s growing regional and 
global interests are pushing it towards a land and maritime 
balance in the strategy of its foreign policy.  In China’s 
late imperial period, China seemed poised to take the lead 
in regional and global exploration by the sea.  However, 
Qing ambivalence towards the sea and a greater need for 
consolidation of its frontiers in central Asia drove China 
to look inward to its continental boundaries.  Some 
historians argue that China had no interests in projecting 
its dominion globally and instead only sought to dominate 
Asia.  To a large extent, the Chinese sea-faring tradition 
  6 
disappeared with the finish of the Treasure Fleets in the 
15th century.1   
Following the initial phase of development of the PRC 
between 1949 and 1976, China began to look outward in the 
maritime realm.2  This initial period was overwhelmingly 
influenced by Mao Zedong, who looked at PRC maritime power 
as a great defensive wall at sea more than an instrument to 
exercise control over its extended contiguous seas.  This 
was due in large part to the traditional continental 
orientation and Soviet training received in the formative 
years of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which 
emphasized a continental mindset towards the usage of naval 
power.3  Strictly defined, the PLAN during the Mao period 
served as a coastal navy or fleet-in-being during this 
period with limited capability to project force beyond the 
brown water of China's coastline into the open ocean and 
seas of East Asia.   
The economic reformation of China launched under Deng 
Xiaoping from 1978 onward brought the use of maritime power 
by China to the forefront.  Seeing the future of Chinese 
commerce flowing by sea from the numerous coastal special 
economic zones (SEZ’s), China entered a new phase in its  
maritime strategy.4  Jiang Zemin carried the navy's 
expansion a step farther with the building programs of the 
                      
1 "People's Liberation Army Navy," Global Security.org, Avail able 
Online at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan -
overview.htm], 20 February 2003. 
2 Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 
Twenty-First Century, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
2001), 24. 
3 Norman Freidman, Seapower as Strategy, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 53-54. 
4 Cole, 26. 
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1990's brought about by the end of the Cold War and 
shifting threats to China's maritime security.          
2. Current Maritime Orientation: Fact and Fiction 
The reality of China's maritime posture does not quite 
meet the grand visions of some Chinese naval officers and 
theorists.  Instead, the PRC is vying to extend the reach 
of the PLAN with very limited resources.  The PRC views the 
East and South China Seas as the theaters with the greatest 
potential for maritime conflict.  Therefore, they have 
assigned the newest and most technically advanced units to 
these fleets, including the "Emergency Mobile Force." 5  
Chinese maritime strategy has yet to reach maturity in 
extending the reach and power of the PRC beyond the South 
China Sea.  The most daunting prospect in East Asia is the 
buildup of Chinese forces in the mid-to long-term.  
However, one has only to look so far as the patterns of 
acquisition and emphasis, or lack thereof, devoted to naval 
building.  This will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter V.    
The long-term vision of the PLAN emanates from Admiral 
Liu Huaqing--sometimes called China’s Mahan or its 
Gorshkov-- the latter being infinitely more appropriate 
because of Liu’s education in the USSR.  Liu shifted the 
continental vision of a limited defense in the immediate 
area of China (150 to 600 nautical miles) to strengthen the 
security of China’s maritime boundaries out to the so 
called “second island chain” composed of a line through the 
Kuriles, Japan, the Bonins, Marianas, and the Carolines. 6  
This line of maritime strategic thinking led the PLAN to 
                      
5 "People's Liberation Army Navy."  
6 Ibid., 166. 
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invest heavily in ships of sea-going caliber, frigate-sized 
and larger, and logistic support.  However, as is the case 
with visions of grandeur and reality, China is still a 
continental power in the short to mid-term with ambitions 
to expand influence in East Asia. 
Analysis of China’s maritime military outlook and its 
approach is complicated by a lack of transparency.  The 
closest approximation to a National Military Strategy for 
China comes in the form of the National Military Strategy 
Guidelines for the New Period.7     
3. China's Massive Maritime Potential 
The factor that sets China apart is sheer manpower and 
human capital available to develop an ocean-going navy.  
Already China possesses the largest maritime force in East 
Asia in terms of manpower and number of combatants in East 
Asia with 215,000 personnel, 146 surface combatants, and 65  
submarines.8  However, it does not have the largest force by 
tonnage.  Organized into three primary fleets (North Sea 
Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet), the bulk of 
the PLAN’s combat power is concentrated in the southern two 
fleets.   
Because of the perennial guessing game of estimating 
China’s total defense expenditure, determining Beijing’s 
expenditures for its fleets is nearly impossible.  
Observers have noted an increase in the overall PRC defense 
budget in recent years, partially triggered by the 
                      
7 "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of 
China," Defenselink 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/china06222000.htm], 24 June 
2002.  
8 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedburg, ed., Strategic Asia: 
Power and Purpose 2001-02, (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2001), 372-373. 
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government’s ordering the PLA out of commercial ventures in 
an effort to increase professionalism in China's armed 
forces.  Even with the growth of the Chinese economy, 
ironically, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its 
branches are not the primary benefactors of the Chinese 
economic boom.  Under economic policy of “four 
modernizations,” China’s military capabilities are 
prioritized last and do not receive the priority in funding 
provided to further development of the economy, 
industrialization, the sciences and technology. 
4. Taiwan  
The first security challenge in the PRC maritime 
strategic vision is the issue of conflict with Taiwan.  
Beijing regards this as an internal Chinese matter.  
Whether reunification occurs by means of force or 
peacefully remains uncertain, but the Chinese naval buildup 
across the Taiwan Strait continues in response to the 
arming of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 
giving the Republic of China (ROC) a de facto ally of the 
United States.9  Shortly after taking office President 
George W. Bush cleared the air of strategic ambiguity over 
Taiwan, somewhat when he pledged the United States would 
“do whatever it takes” to defend the Republic of China. 10  
In response to continued American support for Taiwan, the 
largest buildup in the PLAN occurred in the East Sea Fleet 
stationed opposite the Republic of China in Fujian 
Province.  Focused on acquiring platforms suitable to match 
the Taiwanese and United States Navy’s technical advantage, 
                      9 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and Empty 
Fortress: China's Search for Security, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997), 67-68. 
10 “President George W. Bush Interview with Katie Couric,” NBC’s 
Today Show, April 2000.  
  10 
the PLAN embarked on a course of purchasing platforms such 
as the Russian Sukhoi Bureau’s SU-27 and SU-30 fighters as 
well as Russian Sovremenny destroyers.11  This buildup will 
be discussed at greater length in Chapter V.   
Beyond the potential for conflict, Chinese 
reunification poses a huge question in the East Asian 
maritime realm.  If the Republic of China’s (ROCN) hybrid 
technologies and its approach to building the quality 
systems-level components that the PLAN lacks fell to the 
PRC, Beijing would possess far greater power in East Asian 
nautical sphere.  Inclusion of ROCN assets—especially it 
submarines and surface warships, would instantly double 
China’s blue water capability.  For example, the ROCN 
operates seven American-designed Oliver Hazard Perry 
frigates (with an eighth planned for commissioning in 
2003), a first-line combatant in the United States Navy.12  
These frigates possess the SM-1 Standard missile system 
that would give the PLAN an area air defense (AAD) 
capability, albeit limited, it has lacked since its 
inception.13  This AAD capability could be nearly doubled in 
range if the reunification occurred after the transfer, 
approved by the Bush administration, of four Kidd-class air 
defense destroyers.14 
Potential ROCN integration not only poses difficult 
questions of more advanced technology, but also of 
reformation in training, supply, and employment of the 
                      11 Cole, 27.  
12 David Miller, Warships: From 1860 to the Present, (London: 
Salamander Books, Ltd.), 2001, 480.  
13 Ibid, 478. 
14 A. D. Baker, "World Navies in Review," United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, March 2003, 48.  
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PLAN.  The shipbuilding infrastructure on Taiwan would 
markedly increase China’s maritime output.  On a 
geopolitical scale, reconciliation by the PRC and ROC would 
mean Chinese dominion over many of the critical SLOCs in 
the East China Sea supplying the Koreas and Japan and may 
have unintended consequences.       
B. JAPAN 
1. Japanese Maritime Tradition 
By virtue of its geographic position and insular 
nature, Japan has a well-established naval tradition.  This 
includes attacks on its neighbors China and Korea, 
especially the thwarted invasion of Korea by Hideyoshi 
Toyotomi in the sixteenth century.  Early in the Meiji 
Reformation Japan took the naval role model of the 
similarly insular and highly successful British Empire.  
The most notable demonstration of Japan’s naval prowess 
came following the stunning victory by Admiral Togo in the 
Strait of Tsushima in 1905 over the Russian Fleet.  The 
ascent of Japanese maritime power projection halted in the 
mid-1940's with the annihilation of the navy and maritime 
fleet in World War II.  Though the war had thoroughly 
reduced the size of the Japanese military and maritime 
fleet, Japan’s war machine was never fully dismantled.  
Under American pressure, units from the Japanese Maritime 
Safety Agency (JMSA, the Japanese Coast Guard), 
participated in amphibious operations during the outset of 
the Korean War.15  In the geo-strategic calculus of the 
emerging Cold War, the United States recognized the need 
for a rebuilt Japanese navy to shoulder the burden of 
                      
15 James Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces , 
1945-1971, (New York: Praeger Press), 1973, 64-67.  
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maritime defense against the Soviet Union in Asia.  Even 
though Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stats that, 
“land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential 
will never be maintained,” Prime Minister Yoshida 
understood the need to rearm Japan.  The 1951 Japan -US 
Mutual Defense Treaty started Japan on the path to 
rearmament.  In 1954, the Self-Defense Forces Law converted 
Japanese constabulary forces into an actual military body, 
under the heading of Self Defense Forces, while the Ban on 
Overseas Defense Force Dispatch Law quelled internal and 
external fears of an overly expeditionary Japanese 
military.      
2. Current Maritime Orientation 
The missions of the MSDF during the Cold War were 
fourfold: defend SLOCs within 1000 nautical miles, 
territorial defense, merchant escort, and finally offensive 
interdiction.16  The JMSDF’s evolution in the Cold War drove 
Japan towards a complementary role to the massive force of 
the United States Navy.  In particular, the JMSDF focused 
on the ability to conduct minesweeping and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) sufficient to thwart the Soviet Far East 
Fleet’s submarine forces setting sail from Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatski and Russian surface vessels based out of 
Vladivostok.17  
The current maritime security philosophy of Japan is 
defensive and focused on the “ambiguity and uncertainty” 
that still exists in Asia, namely “the issue between China 
                      
16 Norman D. Levin and others, The Wary Warriors: Future Directions 
in Japanese Security Policy , (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), 
50. 
17 Ibid. 
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and Taiwan” and “confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.” 18  
Judging by the 2002 Japanese Defense White Paper, Japan’s  
the maritime outlook is nearly as vague in its defensive 
orientation, focusing on the "Operations for the Defense of 
Surrounding Sea Areas and Securing the Safety of Maritime 
Traffic."  This section of the White Paper specifies joint 
operations with air, sea, and United States military assets 
in time of emergency.  Above all, the White Paper 
acknowledges the importance of the flow of "resources, 
energy, foods, and many other materials" into Japan as 
"vital to national existence." 19  As the United States and 
its allies demonstrated in World War II in the Pacific, 
these supplies lines are Japan's greatest strategic 
liability.       
3. Japanese Maritime Power 
Because of its pledge in 1976, made to appease 
criticism over not devoting enough to defense, Japan spends 
one percent of its sizable GNP, amounting to 40.9 billion 
dollars in 2000.  This funding helps the continuation of 
East Asia’s most highly professionalized maritime security 
force, the MSDF, which consists of only 42,600 personnel, 
69 surface combatants, and 16 submarines. 20  Even though the 
MSDF has one-fifth the manpower and less than half of the 
assets of the PRC, Japan has the decided technical edge 
among all of the East Asian navies.  Additionally, the 
MSDF, though lacking the numbers of vessels, has a decided 
edge over the PLAN, especially when considering tonnage.  
Looking to the future, the MSDF has an interest in closely 
                      18 FBIS-CHI-2002-0802, “Japan: Excerpt of 2002 Defense White Paper.” 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ellings and Friedberg, 370, 372-373. 
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monitoring the expansion of Chinese military might to the 
south for its potential to strangle the oil lifeblood of 
the Japanese economy, also a concern for the Republic of 
Korea.  The current organization of the MSDF is four 
maritime defense districts-Ominato, Maizuru, Yokosuka, and 
Sasebo-surrounding Japan with their headquarters in 
Yokosuka.  The MSDF is composed of four escort flotillas 
(one is always in the rapid response posture), two 
submarine flotillas, a fleet air force, two minesweeping 
flotillas, and a training command. 21   
4. Shift in Strategy 
The National Defense Program Outline approved in 
December 1995 shifted the MSDF away from this mission and 
toward becoming a more balanced force capable of multiple 
missions, including operations other than war or 
deterrence.22  These include surveillance, patrol, and 
disaster relief.  The MSDF in the post-Cold War amidst the 
new uncertainty of the global order has shifted its 
missions accordingly.  In the end, its missions other than 
the typical busywork demanded of a maritime force amounts 
to "securing maritime traffic and securing Japanese 
territory."23  The former mission, combined with shifting 
international situation gives rise to reinterpretation of 
former constraints on Japan in a broader Asian security 
context with joint operations between the JMSA and the 
Malaysian Coast Guard in patrolling the Strait of Malacca.  
 
                      21 "Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (Nihon Kaijo Jietai)," Global 
Security.org, available online at 
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/MSDF.htm], 20 
February 2003. 
22 "Japan Maritime Self Defence Force (Nihon Kaijyo Jietai)". 
23 Ibid. 
  15 
5. Expanding Missions Abroad  
Long before the coalition in Desert Storm and the 
current global war on terrorism, in 1981 Prime Minister 
Suzuki Zenko pledged Japan to defend all maritime interests 
within a 1000 nautical mile radius of the home islands 
within the bounds of the nautical realm. 24  This pledge of 
maritime protection, however, is not omnidirectional and 
applies to only the high seas (including international 
straits) and territorial waters of Japan.  It is ironic 
that Japan, for all of its perceived pacifist trappings, 
possesses the most capable blue-water and highly 
professionalized fleet to defend the interests of all East 
Asian nations in the sea lanes.   
The events of September 11, 2001 compelled Japan's 
Diet to authorize extending JMSDF power and diplomacy into 
the Indian Ocean in support of American strike and maritime 
interdiction operations.  Interestingly, even the 
preliminary deployment of logistics support vessels incited 
the ire of the People’s Republic of China, long an opponent 
of expanding Japanese military involvement.  From the 
beginning of the War on Terrorism after the attacks on the 
Pentagon and New York City, Japan provided initial support 
in the form of oilers and logistic support vessels. 25  
However, this recently expanded to deploying a Kongo class 
Aegis destroyer the Kirishima, a huge step for Japan.  
Though not armed with offensive weapons capable of reaching 
far inland, the People’s Republic of China viewed the 
                      
24 Ibid. 
25 Toru Ishikawa, “There Are No Boundaries at Sea,” Proceedings, 
June 2002. 
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deployment of these ships was seen as a militarist action.26  
As Ken Booth once proclaimed, “…a carrier is a carrier is a 
carrier…”27 When other sensitized Asian states deal with 
Japanese military power at sea a destroyer is a destroyer 
is a destroyer, ironic in light of the fact tha t the 
Kirishima proceeded to station in the Indian Ocean/Arabian 
Gulf to relieve a lower technology Japanese destroyer.  
Chinese dismay over this deployment may be nothing more 
than a subtle protest to the ship’s potential Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) capability with the American-designed 
Aegis combat system aboard.      
C. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
1. Maritime Tradition 
From the Choson period to modern times, Korean naval 
and maritime tradition served an important role in the 
development of Korea and Northeast Asia.  Korean maritime 
tradition helped sow the seeds of Korean and Chinese 
culture throughout Northeast Asia.  Additionally, though 
typically overshadowed by Korea’s “continental 
orientation”28 and tradition of its military leaders, 
Admiral Yi Sun-shin serves as an important and 
inspirational naval leader and national hero to Koreans.  
In the modern era, Korea’s divided navies and maritime 
traditions have led separate lives due to different levels 
of prosperity and defense priorities.  This has led to 
                      26 FBIS-CHI-2002-1219.  “Hits Out at Japan for Sending Warships to 
the Indian Ocean, Warns of Militarism.”  
27 K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy. (London: Croom Helm), 1977, 
71. 
28 Edward A. Olsen, "Prospects for an Increased Naval Role for the 
Republic of Korea in Northeast Asian Security," Monterey, California, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1989, 9.         
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recurrent clashes over territorial waters, fishing rights, 
and other resources.   
Due to Korea’s position on the Asian continent and 
proximity to sea routes, the Korean maritime tradition may 
be traced back as far as the ancient Choson period, 29 when 
the Koreans began building naval forces against invasion 
and in protection of maritime activities.  Additionally, 
the coastal Koreans made their living fishing and gathering 
seaweed.30   
In the time of the Three Kingdoms, the Paekche people 
continued to build on the earlier maritime tradition of the 
Choson and established maritime control of the sea around 
the Korean Peninsula.  In contrast to the ‘Irish of Asia’ 
moniker that is often misapplied to the Koreans, it was 
during the Paekche period that Korean seamen garnered the 
self-proclaimed term “the Asiatic Phoenician[s]” 31 for their 
maritime capabilities.  Sailing from Shantung, Liaosi, and 
outlying Japanese islands, the Korean transported Chinese 
and Korean culture and eventually spread to Japan and 
shores beyond the works of Confucius, other Chinese 
classical works, and aspects of Korean and Chinese 
traditions.   
Korean seamen spread Korean and Chinese culture and 
influence through merely sailing in search of trade and 
riches.  At the end of the 4th century A.D., the Paekche 
                      29 "The Korean Maritime History."  Republic of Korea Navy Homepage.  
[http://www.navy.go.kr/public/fe04.html], 16 March 2002.   
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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maritime dominance of Northeast Asia spread from the Gulf 
of Bohai to Cheju Island32.        
Following World War II, the Republic of Korea 
established the precursor to its modern navy with United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) assistance in August of 1946.33  
The ROKN proceeded through four periods of evolution: “a 
maintenance period” (1953-1965), “a build-up of war 
potential period (1965-1974), “a constructing of foundation 
for self-reliance national defense” period (1975-1993), and 
the “advanced navy period” (1994 to present). 34 
2. Current Maritime Orientation 
The missions of the Republic of Korea Navy are war 
deterrence, protecting national sovereignty, protecting 
maritime rights, supporting government foreign policy, and 
enhancing national prestige.35  Then President Kim Dae Jung 
enunciated a new naval vision for Korea in a speech at the 
Korean Naval Academy in Chinhae on March 20, 2001.  Kim 
presented the graduating midshipmen with the challenge to 
be a contributing factor in the "strategic mobile fleet."  
This concept would logically bridge the gap between a 
coastal navy and a blue water fleet. 36  Recent developments 
in South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense reflect the 
reconciliation focus of the departed Kim administration’s 
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“Sunshine Policy.”  Interestingly, the Republic of Korea 
put its most recent biannual National Defense White Paper 
on hold indefinitely to remove all references to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the “main 
enemy,” an expression earned in light of the fifty-plus 
years of enmity and the 1995 remark about Seoul in “a sea 
of flames.”37  Whether or not the newly elected 
administration of Roh Myun Hyun continues Kim’s trajectory 
towards reunification remains to be seen and will directly 
affect the focus of the South Korean military from its 
immediate mission of self defense to its future to the 
south in Asia.  Beyond the immediate missions against the 
DPRK, the ROKN is looking outward in its training, 
infrastructure, and acquisitions.    
Along with the booming Japanese and Chinese maritime 
role, the South Koreans created a robust shipbuilding 
capability and merchant marine to augment their economic 
rise.  Their virtually insular position on the Korean 
Peninsula also made this a necessity.  ROK shipbuilding has 
earned a position of high-esteem and great importance to 
the economic well-being of South Korea.  The shipbuilding 
and merchant marine of South Korea ultimately play a huge 
role in Korea’s further development and energy security by 
constructing the tankers to transport virtually all of 
South Korea’s crude oil supply and the naval combatants to 
protect it.       
Whether the two Koreas unite peacefully in the near 
future or remain separate entities, the often forgotten 
maritime and naval tradition of the Koreans remains an 
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important facet in the emerging post Cold War international 
climate in the globalizing world.  A unified Korea would 
pose many tough questions for its neighbors and for itself 
in terms of maritime security and potential, with a 
combined population of 70 million and a powerful economy 
after recovery from reunification.   
3. Renewed Hostilities with the North 
In the event of a conflict between North and South 
Korea, the outcome on the Yellow and East Seas could be 
potentially far more lopsided than a conflict between 
Taiwan and China.  In event of renewed conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula, some assessments state that the Korean 
People’s Navy (KPN) of the DPRK could be marginally 
effective in the first 30-90 days of a conflict38 and would 
shift to a fleet-in-being status thereafter.  Expansion of 
force structure afloat and the ability to project power 
beyond insertions along the South Korean coastline and 
minor amphibious operations remains a low priority in the 
DPRK, and may be indicative of larger military goals of the 
North--paranoid self-preservation.   
In contrast to recent engagements by the North and 
South over fishing and passage rights in the Yellow Sea, in 
the event of a war between the Koreas the war at sea would 
be a decisive South Korean victory.  Especially in light of 
the loosening of ROKN rules of engagement (ROE) after a 
disastrous naval, skirmish over the Northern Limit Line 
(NLL)--the seaward extension of the Demilitarized Zone.   
The KPN, though vastly outnumbering the Republic of 
Korean Navy, has serious deficiencies in operating at night 
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and in foul weather.39  In addition to these material 
deficiencies, it will continue to receive extremely limited 
funding to ameliorate its shortcomings due to North Korea’s 
energy crisis.  Additionally, South Korean and allied naval 
forces in a prolonged conflict would easily exploit 
electronic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and 
air defense shortcomings.40  The greater endurance of the 
ROKN in their predominantly blue ocean-oriented warships 
would fare better than the fast attack North Korean 
vessels.   
Additionally, as previously mentioned, almost all of 
the North Korean Navy’s anti-ship missile technology 
remains based on 1960’s Soviet technology.  American and 
Western defense technology used by the ROKN, again not 
constrained by ROE, has grown strong to counter the threat.  
Although overwhelming numbers of KPN missile boats 
theoretically could mount swarm attacks with massed salvos, 
the ROKN ships’ defensive capabilities are focused on this 
type of threat and possible employment.  Moreover, the ROKN 
has a decided advantage if hostilities did break out in 
that it is better adjusted to joint operations with a 
robust command, control, computers, communications, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as a 
result of operating with the United States Navy and other 
technologically advanced armed forces.      
4. ROKN Expansion 
As have several other nations with a need to protect 
maritime security and commerce, the ROK has embarked on an  
interestingly ambitious effort to expand the capabilities 
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of the ROK armed forces.  Defense expenditures are set at 
3.1 percent, or about $15 billion, 41 for the total defense 
budget.  A large portion this funding goes to expanding and 
improving the sea-going quality of the ROKN’s 35,000 
personnel, 54 surface combatants, and 19 diesel 
submarines.42  The ROKN fleet organization is distributed 
amongst three sector commands--the East, West, and South 
Seas.   
South Korea will remain a small, yet ambitious 
maritime power and continue to develop a greater blue water 
capability to preserve its SLOCs, particularly in interests 
of its national trade via its merchant marine and shipping 
lanes.  Primarily, the expansion of ROK naval power 
logically follows protecting the country’s burgeoning need 
for energy resources transported by sea.  As some 
commentators speculated prior to the end of the Cold War 
and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ROK Navy grew in 
proportion to South Korea’s industrial growth and 
“dependence on shipping to and from Korea…raw materials and 
finished goods.”43  Finally, the Republic of Korea will 
build its navy to defend disputed maritime territory with 
China, Japan, and North Korea.  The possibility of coming 
clashes in Northeast Asia will most certainly stem from the 
scramble for resources by the principal participants. 
The best of all worlds for Korea is obviously peaceful 
reunification and combining the armed forces of the North 
and the South.  In the naval realm, the two navies are 
complementary.  The fast patrol vessels of the North would 
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be well suited for a coastal patrol arm or a coast guard.  
The South’s blue water ships would serve in an enlarging 
oceanic fleet possibly centered on an indigenously produced 
aircraft carrier to form a carrier battle group.  The mine 
laying capability of the North could be retained for 
defensive purposes.  The older North Korean submarines 
would be towed to the breakers where they belong and the 
amphibious fleet of both navies could be scaled back to 
allow for operations on and around the thousands of Korean 
islets.  An interesting prospect for the reduction or 
disposal of the KPN could lie in a deal not unlike the 
German-Indonesian naval transfer, which sent the former 
East German fleet to Southeast Asia for a little over $30 
million.  A nation needing a low-tech force of patrol-boat 
sized vessels could profit from the reunification of the 
Koreas.            
D. OVERALL NATURE OF EAST ASIAN NAVIES AND THEIR MARITIME 
VISION 
The navies of China, Japan, and South Korea all share 
the dream of blue water operations.  However, East Asian 
maritime security is constrained by international political 
outlooks (Japan), fear of an arms race (in China), and 
overall lack of funds (South Korea), especially after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997.  None of the three leading 
East Navies possesses combatants larger than a destroyer, 
therefore limiting their range of operations to the 
immediate area without logistic support.  The East Asia 
navies are fleets of working class ships.  None of the 
navies has high cost, upper echelon naval combatants such 
as cruisers or carriers for protracted employment.  The 
East Asian navies therefore are in no danger of approaching 
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the bloated Churchillian "luxury fleet" status of 
battleship fleets like the Kreigsmarine exiting the Kiel 
Canal during World War I. 
The three East Asian naval powers envision their 
respective fleets as power projection instruments to 
protect commerce and energy flows.  All are in different 
stages of development.  Japan clearly possesses the ability 
to patrol its extended SLOCs.  China and South Korea focus 
on immediate contingencies in Taiwan and the Korean 
Peninsula respectively.  However, the PRC and ROK are 
actively pursuing long-range capabilities at sea to protect 
national interests, including the flow of energy products 
and sea-based resources.  Both are in position to push 
their maritime roles outward to the extended SLOCs.  China 
in particular is working to extend its maritime reach using 
its limited naval resources into the South China Sea and 
Southeast Asia.           
The East Asian navies therefore are at a turning point 
in expanding their capabilities to extend their reach over 
the extended SLOCs.  Moreover, while China, as mentioned 
earlier, is researching means to build a carrier, but it 
still lacks the funding, infrastructure, and quality 
control required for such an endeavor.  The East Asian 
navies are clearly not competitive as much as they are 
complementary in preserving the status quo in the immediate 
region.  The United States Navy will continue to be relied 
upon for China’s, Japan’s, and South Korea’s maritime 
interests outside of East and Southeast Asia.  The East 
Asian navies and their development are all rife with 
potential, but they still lack the capability to enforce 
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long-range SLOC security without the United States Navy.  
In the end the balance of the East Asian naval powers in 
protecting their immediate areas of interest in the region, 
compliment the United States Navy’s vision of security 
while preventing the rise of a regional power.  The 
economic focus of these countries - the PRC, Japan, and 
South Korea - ensures the ability of America to remain the 
predominant power in East Asian maritime security.   
E. RAMIFICATIONS EAST ASIAN MARITIME VISIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
Continued American interest in the East Asian naval 
powers maritime potential comes with the recurrent theme of 
preserving the free flow of commerce brought about by 
safeguarding freedom of navigation.  The broader context of 
American interests in the region, including the terrestrial 
side, focus on the engagement of East Asia in the maritime 
realm and on ensuring that no single power establishes 
dominance over the region.  With these two factors in mind, 
the United States must promote a robust maritime presence 
in Asia backed by air and land forces.  The policy of 
“places not bases,” combined with additional presence in 
the Western Pacific, as recommended in the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, will bolster these strategic aims, but it 
will only go so far.  The United States must acknowledge 
the principal changes in the nautical environment of the 
region and conditions to ensure the stability of maritime 
East Asia.  These changes have made the waterways of East 
Asia more important to the world than ever before.       
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III. POST-COLD WAR MARITIME ORDER OF EAST ASIA 
A. POWER VACUUM? 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War brought about a potential power vacuum in the waters of 
East Asia.  Fears of the end of the bipolar order at sea 
have driven some nations to purchase or upgrade their naval 
and coast guard forces against the uncertainties of an 
emerging multipolar order.  Instead, the American presence 
remained, though reduced by about forty percent since 
1990,44 and continues to preserve the flow of commerce by 
enforcing freedom of navigation in the waters of East Asia.  
However, the changes to the SLOCs result from a longer-term 
multilateral change in the maritime regime of East Asia.  
The United States Navy has remained on station after the 
Cold War’s end, ensuring the safety of the SLOCs and the 
increasingly important maritime movement of global 
commerce.  This, combined with the new international 
maritime regime, presents the greatest changes to East 
Asia’s SLOCs.   
This chapter will focus on the changes to the SLOCs 
following the Cold War, not only because of the 
disappearance of the Soviet fleet, but also changes in 
international law and regional security demands.  The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and East Asia's rising importation of energy resources have 
increased the importance of the sea to China, Japan, and 
South Korea.  In the end, we shall see that the 
disappearance of the Soviet Fleet and the end to the 
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bipolar order at sea in did not have the greatest impact on 
the transformation of the nautical environs of East Asia.   
B. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION LAW OF THE SEA 
1. History 
Law has long had a place at sea.  From the free usage 
of the sea ideas of Hugo Grotius (DeGroot) in 160445 through 
it current iterations in the United Nations, law at sea has 
regulated division of the sea, maritime warfare, dispute 
resolution, commerce, and the resources from the sea.  The 
1982 UNCLOS, sometimes also called UNCLOS III or the Third 
UNCLOS, codified a new international system delineating the 
bounds of nations’ maritime borders and the usage of ocean 
resources within these limits.  The UNCLOS originated in 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
subsequent revisions in the 1970's making up UNCLOS I and 
II.  Signed in 1982, the UNCLOS ratified and entered into 
force in November 1994 and provided a global framework for 
dividing the world’s oceans.           
2. Impact 
The UNCLOS in 1982 multilaterally delineated nations’ 
seaward boundaries on the international stage for the first 
time in history.  The continent that UNCLOS 1982 has had 
the greatest impact on is Asia, with its overwhelming 
maritime orientation and extensive number of archipelagic 
nations.  The convention set the maximum limit for nations' 
maritime claims by establishing the guidelines for the 
terrestrial base line for the claim, the limit to an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf. 46  
                      45 Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power in the Twenty-First Century, 
(Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Limited), 1992, 15.  
46 Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, eds., Calming the Waters: 
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National University), 1996, 78. 
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For example, a nation’s EEZ and continental shelf may 
extend no further than 200 miles from its baseline.   
In addition to nations' seaward boundaries established 
by this convention, the right of passage by vessels through 
different regimes--including the territorial waters and 
high seas--achieved international codification and 
acceptance with few exceptions.  By definition, vessels 
including warships, may enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through any nation's territorial waters, which extend 
twelve miles from the baseline.  The high seas begin beyond 
12 miles and include, in some instances, international 
straits that fall within a nation's bounds, qualifying as 
territorial seas.  These high seas qualify for transit 
passage or free passage in any mode of a ship’s operation 
including submerged by a submarine.   
Setting these boundaries and UNCLOS 1982’s entering 
into force in November 1994 meant that nations enjoyed 
jurisdiction over their territorial waters and contiguous 
zone (up to 24 miles).  In addition to the patrolling of 
these waters, nation’s maritime interest extends out to 200 
miles in an exclusive economic zone, the main area in which 
the UNCLOS sought to define a state’s rights to extract the 
sea's resources.  This included provisions for deep seabed 
mining, which caused difficulties in the U.S. agreement and 
ratification of the convention.  Lastly, UNCLOS 1982 
provides a mechanism for dispute resolution. 47  However, all 
three East Asian maritime powers--China, Japan, and South 
Korea--have signed the UNCLOS for different reasons.   
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The UNCLOS gives China a hold on its offshore 
resources that has gained increasing importance in the 
industrialization and modernization of the country.  With 
this comes a Malthusian problem, both in terms of feeding 
the engines of commerce and the people who operate them.  
China sees the utility of the UNCLOS for the clear-cut 
boundaries it places on resources and resolution of claims 
through historical usage.  In addition, the UNCLOS has 
provided China with a voice in international maritime 
affairs, despite the lack of a blue water navy.  One can 
only hope that the UNCLOS dispute resolution and the ASEAN 
Code of Conduct (explained in detail in chapter five) 
contribute to Chinese thinking on resolving disputes in the 
South China Sea, so that there are no repeats of it 
approach experienced in 1974, 1988, and 1995. 
Both Japan and Korea see the UNCLOS according to their 
insular positions and, not unlike China, need to expand 
their indigenous resource base.  They both rely heavily on 
the UNCLOS to the end of freedom of navigation on the high 
seas.  Japan has used the dispute resolution mechanisms in 
resolving fisheries problem, but not those of territorial 
claims.  Particularly important territorial claims in the 
East and Yellow Seas obfuscate the potential for resolution 
of ownership.  Instead, joint development ventures took 
root early in the evolution of the current UNCLOS.  Japan 
and South Korea began joint mineral exploration in December 
1970 with Taiwan to mine an area in the East China Sea off 
the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula and Japan. 48  This 
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venture continued in its current form between Japan and 
South Korea. 
3. Unintended Consequences 
Though the United Nations had the best of intentions 
and international support in the formulation of UNCLOS 
1982, the convention wrought unintended consequences on the 
global maritime order.  Many observers of naval matters 
claim that the 1982 UNCLOS may have intensified the sources 
of naval conflict with its delimitation of sea boundaries 
and created a “double-edged sword” at sea.49  Smaller 
nations, long quiet about the division of resources at sea, 
now have a tool to deal with larger neighbors.  The South 
China Sea (explored in further depth in Chapter Four) is an 
excellent example of the scramble for resources brought 
about by a new twist in international law.  The UNCLOS may 
have added clear boundaries at sea, but it created new 
openings for debate among nations as to the nature of 
ownership of the sea’s resources. 
One particular problem of the UNCLOS is that it 
extends rights of ownership to habitable islands only.  
Consequently, the nations of East Asia and Southeast Asia 
have made islets that do not technically meet the UNCLOS 
definition of ownership into miniature outposts by placing 
wharfs, shacks, and other manmade structures on them to 
solidify their claims of ownership.  Moreover, these 
claims, naively optimistic at best, linked to claims on 
continental shelves surrounding islands, further 
complicating matters of ownership over adjoining islands. 
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The EEZ’s and continental shelf claims brought about 
by the UNCLOS, as stated earlier brought about the problem 
of delimiting the areas of ownership in East Asia.  Because 
of the 200-mile limit on ownership of these two 
aforementioned regions and the fact that none of the East 
Asian naval powers are separated by 400 miles, equidistant 
lines may be drawn between the nations.  However, 
territorial matters further confuse matters by inhibiting 
the delimiting of East Asian waters.  Disputes in the 
Tokdo/Takeshima Islands and Senkaku/Diaoyu Dai Islands may 
never be fully resolved and will prevent clear boundaries 
from being set in East Asia.    
C. EAST ASIA'S RISING MARITIME ENERGY DEPENDENCE  
The forces of industrialization in East Asia have 
driven an insatiable demand for energy, namely oil from the 
Middle East.  These forces have awakened a “sleeping giant” 
- a phrase falsely attributed to Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto 50 
- but now eerily applicable to East Asia’s energy 
consumption.  The industrial and technological rise  of 
Japan, South Korea, and China placed an even heavier burden 
on the international oil supplying.  Overall, the average 
yearly increase in energy consumption for the Asia -Pacific 
region is growing at a rate of 3-5 percent for the between 
1997 and 2002.51  By comparison, North American and European 
energy consumption has grown by one percent in the same 
period.52  The rate of growth in consumption and competition 
over oil of East Asian states will inevitably encourage 
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military and political contention over this strategic 
commodity.   
1. PRC 
The PRC remains the second largest energy consumer in 
the world behind the United States. 53  The dominant fuel 
usage in China is coal, which leads the world in 
consumption and production, also leading China to possess 
seven of the top ten most polluted cities in the world and 
a looming environmental crisis. 54  China became a net oil 
importer in 1993.  China's petroleum industry is focused on 
domestic demand and supplying Japan with about 50,000 bbl/d 
from the Daqing oilfields.55  Expected to nearly double, 
China's oil consumption may rise from an estimated 4.9 
million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2001 to 10.5 million 
bbl/d by 2020.  Some estimates place the increase in 
China’s oil consumption at as high as 200%. 56  Assuming this 
rate of use and no foreign exports, China's current proven 
reserves of 24 billion barrels57 would last the PRC a little 
over six years.   
Areas of offshore explorations including the Bohai 
Sea, Pearl River Mouth, and the South China Sea are 
believed to hold only another 8.4 billion barrels 58 granting 
China a little less than 8.5 years of energy independence 
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at the projected 2020 rate of usage.  Chinese 
representatives speak of their intentions to create a 
national petroleum reserve but no action on this matter has 
taken place and it has yet to be seen if the reserve would 
resemble the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve or the minimum 
stock level type of reserves Japan and South Korea 
possess.59 
With these factors in mind, China will grow 
increasingly reliant on energy flows by sea from the Middle 
East, Southeast Asia and other regions. 60  Overland pipeline 
projects are in progress, but may not meet the immediate 
need in the same manner as oil from the Middle East.  
Interestingly, China has made inroads into the Middle East 
and Africa oil supplies and placed controversial emphasis 
on obtaining concession in Iraq and Sudan. 61  In particular, 
China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Norinco are in 
the process of developing the Al-Ahdab field in Central 
Iraq.62   
As of 1993, China already had a large dependence on 
overseas oil transported via the sea (see Appendix A) and 
this is only expected to increase with the PRC’s economic 
growth.  However, China is not nearly as reliant on 
overseas oil as say pre-World War Two Japan, but does have 
short to medium concerns about its oil supply.  In tandem 
with the Chinese perceptions of an Indian threat, the 
rising dependence on oil by the PRC gives the PLAN 
                      59 Ibid. 
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justification for increasing capabilities focused southward 
past the South China Sea.           
2. Japan 
Japan is the world’s second largest energy importer 
and fourth largest energy consumer. 63  Despite the 
stagnation of the Japanese economy, oil importation remains 
high at 5.44 million bbl/d after declining from 5.9 million 
bbl/d in 1996.  Possessing scant proven reserves, only 59 
million barrels,64 when compared to China, Japan is 
dependent on the flow of oil from the Middle East.  Eighty 
percent of Japan’s oil flows from the Middle Eastern 
countries United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Iran.65  China supplies light oil to Japan via 
its Daqing fields and the remainder flows from Southeast 
and Central Asia.  Oil accounts for fifty two percent of 
Japan's energy usage.  Japan’s rate of oil consumption is 
not expected to increase markedly in the same period as 
China’s probable increasing reliance. 
The loss of concessions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait by 
Japan’s Arabian Oil Company (AOC) focused Japan on supplies 
in Iran.  Japan Petroleum Exploration Corporation (Japex) 
is currently negotiating for the rights to the Azadegan 
field possessing some 6 billion barrels of proven reserves.  
Additionally, Japan has sought to ensure its supply through 
further diversification in Central Asia, particularly the 
Caspian Sea region.  The greatest question for these 
emerging sources of oil for Japan remains their means and 
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route of transportation.  The Caspian Sea region presents 
many complexities of transport, whereas the Iranian oil may 
simply be routed south to ports on the Arabian Sea, 
forgoing the political climate of the Persian Gulf.  
Protecting Japan’s oil supply remains a critical link 
in Japan’s Comprehensive Security and a crucial interest of 
the United States.  The role of the JMSDF in protecting the 
flow of oil is critical but subject to domestic and 
international pressures of rising Japanese military 
adventurism.  However, Japan is actively participating in 
policing the Strait of Malacca under the guise of anti-
piracy patrols via the JMSA.  Interestingly, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore all welcomed the action with the 
understanding that Chinese naval expansion as the main 
concern.66  This served as an indirect linkage to Japan’s 
rising cognizance of China’s naval expansion southward 
threatening Japanese energy security.                   
3. ROK  
Despite its size and position, the Republic of Korea 
is the fourth largest oil importer in the world.67  
Moreover, South Korea possesses no domestic oil reserves 
and thus relies entirely on overseas sources.  Petroleum 
consumption consists of fifty-six percent of the ROK’s 
energy consumption at a rate of 2.1 million bbl/d. 68  This 
is down from the high in 1997 of 2.3 million bbl/d.   
A long-term energy strategy of South Korea includes 
major concessions in 13 countries including Yemen, 
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Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Libya, and Vietnam.  Of these, 
they have four operational oil fields in Yemen, Argentina, 
Peru, and the North Sea.  With this overwhelming overseas 
dependence, South Korea, like Japan and the United States, 
developed a short-term solution to its energy reliance.  
The ROK developed a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) 
intended as a shock absorber for a 90-day period.  The ROK 
government expanded the SPR in the 2001 from 60 days in 
part to meet entry into the IEA. 69   
The multiple overseas sources drive the wartime 
mission of the ROKN to defend not only the SLOCs to the 
south in the vicinity of China, but also to the east past 
Japan.  South Korea will remain dependent on overseas oil 
supplies and consequently in a tenuous security position.  
This realization of the importance of energy security 
drives the expansion in size and capability of the ROKN. 
All three East Asian naval powers are seeking 
alternative energy sources to oil and some, including 
China, have even enacted measures to curtail its domestic 
usage.70   
D. CHANGES IN THE SLOCS OF EAST ASIA 
The change in maritime environment in East Asia post-
Cold War added insecurity rather than stability.  The 
UNCLOS, though well intentioned has had multiple impacts, 
including rearranging the borders of nations at sea and 
creating new conflict over resources in and below the 
ocean.  Conflicts over the islands of East Asia to include 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and Tokdo/Takeshima islands were                       
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exacerbated by international law, as the next chapter will 
show.  Conflicting claims in the South China Sea, also 
discussed in Chapter IV, add instability to the maritime 
regime of East Asia and energy flows from the Middle East.  
These disputes go hand in hand with emerging exploration 
for non-living resources in East Asia, particularly energy 
resources.      
The transport of energy from the Middle East aided in 
the rise of the Asian dragons, but at the same time it 
exposes a weak link that could potentially cripple the 
vibrant economies of East Asia in a protracted conflict in 
similar fashion to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  
Expansion of the PLAN, JMSDF, and ROKN southward will only 
serve to alternate in alarming each nation insofar as its 
energy security.  China’s maritime assertiveness would only 
serve to strengthen the JMSDF and ROKN and vice versa.  The 
size of fleets, maritime visions, changes in international 
regimes, and energy demands drive the three navies to look 
outward, but economic, political and historic tensions 
drive them inward.  Given these forces, continued United 
State Navy protection of the extended East Asian SLOCs 
seems the only viable answer at a high cost to the United 
States.  
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IV. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AFFECTING EAST ASIA 
A. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA 
The mechanism of the UNCLOS leads some to assume that 
maritime territorial disputes are in the past or fading 
rapidly.  Nothing could be further from the truth, since 
the East Asian maritime powers dispute several areas 
between them.  Among these are the Tokdo/Takeshima (South 
Korea/Japan) islets, Senkaku/Diaoyu (Japan/China) islands, 
and the previously discussed division of the East China 
Sea-the crossroads between all three East Asian maritime 
powers.  In 1969, the "scramble" for petroleum exploitation 
exploded in East Asia with the East China and Yellow Seas 
at the forefront of division and development.71  
Unfortunately, to date no East Asian nation has exercised 
the apparatus in the convention to resolve ownership of 
disputed territories.  Though the UNCLOS portends a means 
of resolving these disputed islands, the debate over 
ownership has yet to be truly resolved.  Additionally, of 
even greater import to East Asia may be the two island 
groups and an entire sea to the south.  The South China Sea 
presents a SLOC bottleneck and potential flashpoint 
stemming from the dual edged-nature of the UNCLOS.  East 
Asian nations can ill afford disruption of the energy flow 
by sea stemming because of conflict in the South China Sea.   
1. Tokdo/Takeshima 
Tokdo or the Tok Islands are a chain of two small 
islands and nine rocks reefs in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.  
South Korean claims over the Tok Islands stem from King 
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Kojong’s royal order made in the early twentieth century 
that Ulung-do and it adjacent islets, Tokdo being 49 miles 
adjacent to Ulung-do, belonging to the Chosun Dynasty.  
Historic claims reach back to 512 AD in the Three Kingdoms 
period remained unchallenged until, when 1910 the Japanese 
countered the edict by occupying the chain of islets and 
placing them in the Shimane Prefecture.72  At stake on the 
Tok Islands is nearly 16,000 square nautical miles of sea 
and seabed with fisheries resources and petroleum 
potential.73  Annually, more than a thousand fishing boats 
from the ROK and catch 20,000 tons of fish in this area. 74 
The dispute reemerged after the United States military 
government in South Korea returned Tokdo to the ROK in 1948 
with the establishment of the ROK government.75  The ROK 
government declared a fishery zone near Tokdo in 1952, 
which sparked protests from Tokyo.  South Korea recently 
reinforced its claims to Tokdo by constructing berthing 
facilities for 500-ton vessels.76  
Korea and Japan approach the issue of Tokdo/Takeshima 
with differing agendas.  Korea believes Tokdo is an 
uncomplicated issue of historical ownership and usage, 
having controlled the islets for centuries.  The ROK 
government downplays the dispute in light of its occupation 
of the islets and respect for its relations with Japan. 77  
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Conversely, Japan's interests in the resources surrounding 
the island are based largely on the government's 
declaration of a 200 mile EEZ, which virtually includes it.  
This claim by Japan also linked with its dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands, which certain nationalist right wing 
groups have made a greater issue than is necessary .  Little 
can be expected in the way of resolution over 
Tokdo/Takeshima.  Bilateral talks between Japan and Korea 
may be a step towards resolving this matter but should not 
be expected in the near-term especially in light of a 
recent ROK government overture to designate Tokdo a 
national park in 2004.78  
2. Senkaku/Diaoyu 
The Senkaku or Diaoyu islands exist between the Ryukyu 
islands on the continental shelf of China.  Ownership of 
these eight uninhabited islets and three rocks is disputed 
among the PRC, Japan, and Taiwan.  Japanese claims rely 
upon discovery and occupation of the islands in the late 
nineteenth century.79  Chinese claims rely upon discovery 
and administration dating back to the sixteenth century, 
during the Ming Dynasty.80  In addition, China claims that 
the Diaoyu islands were part of Taiwan and surrendered in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 then returned under the 
auspices of the 1945 Potsdam Conference. 81  However, after 
Japan's defeat in World War II, the islands remained under 
U.S. control.  With the impending reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi claimed the islands as 
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Japanese territory in September of 1970. 82  During this same 
time, "the question of petroleum resources on the 
continental shelf of the East China Sea came to the 
surface"83 and China and Taiwan    The Chinese rebutted this 
claim in December 1970 when they condemned the Japan-South 
Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee for mutual exploration of 
the East China Sea.84  In June 1971, amidst protests from 
the PRC and ROC, the United States reverted control of the 
islands to Japan.85 
In 1990, Japan and Taiwan disputed the islands 
ownership.  To this day Taipei does not consider the 
Senkaku Islands to be part of Japan because it does not 
acknowledge Japan's ownership of Okinawa.86  China declared 
them sovereign territory of the PRC along with the South 
China Sea in 1992.87  In 1996, a Japanese rightist group 
rekindled the dispute by sailing to the islands as they had 
in 1978 to build a makeshift lighthouse. 88  The countries 
agreed to ignore their disagreement when they signed a 
fisheries agreement between in November 1997.  This 
agreement set up a "jointly controlled provisional sea zone 
in the East China Sea," as talks continue over the 
establishment of Japan and China's adjoining EEZs.89  The 
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands resurfaces from 
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time to time depending on the environment of joint 
exploration. 
Japan continues to view the Senkaku Islands for their 
fisheries and potential hydrocarbon deposits.  Japanese 
rightists have pressed the sensitive issue and prompted 
Beijing to warn Tokyo about the potential damage to future 
nationalist occurrences.90  Japan has responded by softening 
its approach to territorial disputes in the name of "deep 
consideration towards Beijing." 91  China has similar 
interests, especially in the field of oil exploration.  
Approximately 250 miles southeast of Shanghai, the PRC has 
begun drilling for oil in Block 33/08.92      
3. Yellow Sea 
Another potential hot spot may be in the Yellow Sea 
basin between China and the southern tip of the Korean 
Peninsula.  It is estimated that up to 10 million barrels 
of oil may be on the “silt line” boundary claimed by 
China.93  A proper equidistant line would still place most 
of the basin on the Chinese side, but one of the most 
promising spots would be on the South Korean side. 94  
B. CHINA’S BASIC STANCE ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. The South China Sea: Potential and Turmoil 
The area of greatest concern in the maritime realm in 
East Asia ironically is in the Southeast Asian sub region: 
the strategic chokepoint and flashpoint of the South China 
Sea.  Disputes over islands and resources and China’s 
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claims of control of the area all pose concerns to all 
nations involved in commerce through the area.  How does 
Beijing approach this issue and what are the counter 
arguments posed by neighboring countries.  In addition, 
what could happen if conflict arose in the region?  This 
chapter will seek to answer some of these questions.    
2. Beijing's Approach to the South China Sea 
China's stance on the South China Sea derives from 
historical claims, evolving international law of the sea, 
and the increased importance of resources from the sea.  
The PRC claims a broad swath of water in the South China 
Sea as territorial waters, not inland waters, since the 
claims are based primarily upon two archipelagic chains, 
the Paracels (Xisha) and the Spratly (Nansha) Islands.  The 
Paracels were claimed by both China and Vietnam.  A larger 
contingent of the PRC, Taiwan (ROC), Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia claims the Spratlys.  
These claims are further made contentious by the fact that 
under international law, mainly the UNCLOS 1982, the 
islands claimed by a nation must be fit for human 
habitation at high tide, prompting the Chinese to build 
structures on stilts to maintain an inhabited presence to 
maintain their claims.        
Beijing's approach to the South China Sea has been one 
of securing territory historically claimed to belong to 
China.  Beijing asserts that discovery of the islands by 
the Chinese first occurred during the Han Dynasty (206 
B.C.-220 A.D.)  Chinese administration of the islands began 
in the Yuan Dynasty (1206-1368 A.D.) and mapping and 
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development ensued in the Ming Dynasty (1386 -1644 A.D.)95  
Beijing also cites records dating as far back as the Song 
Dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) adding to the basis of their 
historical claim.96  Moreover, during the Qing Dynasty (A.D. 
1644-1911) China declared the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
as part of their sovereign territory.97  From Beijing’s 
perspective, this history alone, apart from the wealth of 
resources in the region, is a sufficient condition for it 
to consider the South China Sea as the second most 
important issue of national maritime security and 
sovereignty at sea.   
During the Vietnam War, the issue of sovereignty over 
the islands in the South China Sea was not challenged due 
to North Vietnam's need for aid from the PRC and other 
members of the socialist bloc to fight the Americans.  
However, the ailing regime in Saigon held the Paracel 
Islands, and after the American withdrawal from Vietnam and 
imminent collapse of the Republic of Vietnam, China seized 
the Paracel Islands in 1974. 
The changing international order during the Cold War 
and increasing importance of the sea for resour ces in the 
mid-to late 1970's prompted a movement to consolidate 
existing customary law of the sea into an actual 
international regime recognized by the United Nations, 
which eventually became the UNCLOS 1982 agreement.  This 
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arrangement set the general guidelines for the definition 
of boundaries at sea in terms of internal, territorial 
waters, and the high seas.  Additionally, this agreement 
led to the formation of boundaries for zones of protection 
and exploitation by the individual countries owning seaward 
borders, such as contiguous zones, exclusive economic 
zones, and continental shelves.  These, of course, dealt 
with the riches of the deep, including fisheries, 
hydrocarbon resources, and deep-sea minerals.  The latter 
three largely remain untapped due to territorial disputes 
still being resolved and the technological difficulties of 
deep-sea oil drilling and extraction of minerals. 
Beijing's major concern over the South China Sea in 
light of its declared sovereignty and the reinforcing 
international law is the ultimate exploitation of the 
resources in the region.  China needs the South China Sea 
for its fisheries since it is a net importer of food.  It 
also desires the possible hydrocarbon resources in the sea 
since it became a net energy importer in the 1990's.  Due 
to its rising industrialization China needs energy 
resources.  The issue of control of the South China Sea may 
become a Malthusian struggle to meet the task of feeding 
the growing and increasingly productive population of 
China.  Without the potential resources in the South China 
Sea, the engines of economy and progress in China will 
starve and falter.       
3. Beijing's Interests in the South China Sea 
First, the South China Sea is an issue of nationalism 
and political legitimacy for Beijing.  It is a political 
issue both at the international level and at home, 
particularly when dealing with the conception of 
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sovereignty that Beijing has so skillfully manipulated in 
various policy pronouncements and platforms.  One such 
policy in the international arena has been the "five 
principles of peaceful coexistence," which suggests to a 
large extent China's willingness to stay out of other 
countries’ domestic affairs and conversely cautions other 
countries not to interfere in China’s domestic affairs - 
particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea.  
The sovereignty of the South China Sea serves Beijing's 
interests as a two-level game: domestically by reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China in 
reclaiming and maintaining China's sacred territory, and on 
the world stage by demonstrating that China has the might 
and the right to defend its territory in the face of 
competing claims by smaller countries in the region.   
Economically, as stated before, the potential of the 
South China Sea may be significant.  Its usefulness as a 
fisheries area is unquestionable and has led to concerns 
over pollution and over-fishing.  As an energy producing 
area it is unquestionably important to China to be able to 
develop and tap its natural resources.  The South China Sea 
is also the strategic thoroughfare of the high seas for all 
of East and Northeast Asia.  China, Japan and the Korea's 
shipping all run directly through the region on their way 
to their ports of call.  The impact of conflict over the 
islands in the region would most certainly lead to a state 
of paralysis for the shipping that transports not only over 
90 percent of the commerce flowing from China and the 
Northeast Asian countries but also 90 percent of the 
resources required to keep the countries running and 
economically viable.  Moreover, China’s major trading 
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partner, the United States, conveys 90 percent of its trade 
by sea, further reinforcing the tremendous importance of 
the sea lanes in East Asia and Southeast Asia, including 
the South China Sea.98  A closure of sea lanes through the 
South China Sea by any of the parties involved in disputes 
would deeply affect the countries involved and the 
interdependent world economy linked to these countries.  
The sea lanes in Asia will only become more important in 
the decades to come.  Projections of the East Asian 
economy’s current growth rate of 6 percent a year will make 
it one-third of the global gross domestic product by 2025. 99          
4. Beijing's Approach to the South China Sea 
The South China Sea's importance is split among 
domestic and international constituencies.  On one hand, 
Beijing plays up the importance of Chinese sovereignty over 
the region as the historical right of China.  This works 
for domestic consumption and helps keep the fires of 
nationalism stoked toward a larger end of a complete and 
whole China, in a kind of Chinese manifest destiny.  On the 
other hand, the international dimension of China’s 
sovereignty in the South China Sea also has the added facet 
of more recent discoveries of a potential wealth of 
resources. 
On the international level, the South China Sea is not 
only a matter of national sovereignty but also a matter of 
its right to the resources in the disputed area.  This is 
especially so under the provisions of the UNCLOS, which 
dictate the right of nations to extract resources from 
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their exclusive economic zones (up to 200 nautical miles 
from the coast) to their continental shelves (up to 200 
nautical miles also.)  Most of all, the issue of sovereign 
territory becomes an economic issue when dealing with the 
greater potential of the region. 
In this same vein, the economic importance of the 
region is not just in the extraction of sea life for food, 
hydrocarbons, or deep-sea minerals, but also that of the 
sea lanes of communication.  As mentioned before a 
staggering amount of trade to and from China and states 
that are inextricably linked to China through trade ties 
flows through the South China Sea.  The importance of these 
sea lanes can be seen in the amount of military hardware 
Beijing buys and develops for use in the area, combined 
with shows of force.  Recently the naval and air units of 
the PLAN conducted an exercise titled Shensheng (Sacred) 
2002.100  The annual exercise is the culminating joint 
training operation for the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet. 
Additionally, the massive fishery areas in the South 
China Sea and their well being are of great concern to 
Beijing in light of China’s increasing reliance on food 
importation.  Conservation of the fisheries resources in 
the South China Sea is gaining increasing attention from 
government officials, as evidenced by a recent two-month 
fishing ban in the area.101  This follows a fishing ban of 
1999 in the South China Sea, which followed two complete 
bans in the East China and Yellow Seas in 1995.102  Beijing 
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has also become acutely aware of the problem of pollution, 
and as recently as September 2002 it had to deal with 
foreign vessels polluting the waters of the South China 
Sea.      
5. Instruments and Channels of PRC Policy in the 
South China Sea 
In dealing with foreign governments on the South China 
Sea, Beijing prefers a bilateral mode and only secondarily 
through multilateral institutions such as ASEAN. 103  As with 
many issues, China bilaterally can exert its overwhelming 
power and historical relationships with smaller countries 
bordering the South China Sea, giving Beijing leverage.  
The least preferred method is that of dealing 
multilaterally against the Southeast Asian states in ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Nations), which display a 
classical balancing behavior against China to check the 
People's Republic's power. 
China has used military force to back its diplomacy 
several times during the last three decades.  Beijing 
resorted to military force in 1974 using naval and air 
forces against Vietnam to seize control of the Paracels, in 
1988 against Vietnam to seize control of some of the 
Spratlys, and finally in 1995 against the Philippines over 
Mischief Reef.104  This alone shows not only the classic 
Clausewitzian breakdown of diplomatic means to solve a 
dispute, but also Chinese willingness to use force to 
intimidate and reinforce their sovereignty with neighboring 
states over the South China Sea and its islands.  
                      
103 “Basic Stance and Policy of the Chinese Government in Solving the 
South China Sea Issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
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Interestingly, Beijing and Taipei both control islands 
within the South China Sea and often work harmoniously 
together to dominate the region.    
Current indicators of acknowledgment of China’s 
sovereignty over the South China Sea place the prospects of 
Beijing’s claim remaining stable.  It is converting 
economic power into military might to support operations in 
the South China Sea, which is the second highest maritime 
security concern behind a contingency with Taiwan.  In an 
unorthodox turn, China has agreed with ASEAN to reach an 
agreement with Beijing over the South China Sea.   
Beginning with a China-ASEAN informal summit in 1997 
the two parties worked to address the problem of the South 
China Sea.105  November 4, 2002 the parties reached an 
agreement and signed the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea at the conclusion of the 
sixth China-ASEAN Summit (10+1.)106  Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji signed for China and reiterated with the ASEAN 
representatives the need for “good neighborliness and 
mutual trust and to safeguarding peace and stability in the 
South China Sea region.”107  The declaration and attendees 
further stressed the need for peaceful resolution of 
disputes in the region “through friendly coordination and 
negotiation.”108  China and ASEAN all reaffirmed their 
                      
105 "Basic Stance and Policy of the Chinese Government in Solving 
the South China Sea Issue."   
106 “China, ASEAN Sign Code of Conduct on the South China Sea,” 
People’s Daily, 05 November 2002, 
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14 December 2002. 
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commitment to the United Nations Charter, UNCLOS 1982, the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence in the 
declaration.109  This agreement further reinforced China’s 
recent White Paper on National Defense, which followed five 
weeks after the ASEAN-China agreement on the South China 
Sea.110  All signs point toward China’s continued 
sovereignty over its claims in the South China Sea and the 
benefits that follow from ownership of the region.  If any 
conflict is likely within the region, it is of medium-term 
concern with Chinese, ASEAN, and other international 
regimes and institutions holding matters in place.   
C. U.S. INTEREST IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA AND 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
The U.S. makes a point to remain outside of the debate 
over disputed islands in East Asia.  American distancing 
policy in the South China Sea and Tokdo/Takeshima and 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes lends welcome consistency 
in maritime foreign policy beneficial for East Asia.  In 
all likelihood, the situation will remain static, but 
strained.  The disputed territories and unresolved 
ownership are largely ignored in the Sea of Japan and East 
China Sea.  However, the South China Sea remains the most 
salient flashpoint pertinent to the security interests of 
East Asia.  With this disputed sea, above all else, the 
United States endorses freedom of navigation.  This policy 
of ambivalence and continued presence in East Asian waters 
aids the U.S. security goal of preserving the flow of 
                      109 Ibid. 
110 “China Issues White Paper on National Defense,” People’s Daily, 
13 December 2002, 
[http://english.people.com.cn/200212/09/eng20021209_108183.shtml], 13 
December 2002. 
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commerce.  Engaging the regional navies in East and 
Southeast Asia over the issues of the South China Sea 
remains the best solution to this potential maritime choke 
point.       
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V. NAVAL ARMS IN EAST ASIA 
A. NAVAL ARMS RACE EAST ASIA? 
Is a naval arms race emerging in East Asia as a 
natural reaction to the end of the Cold War and emergence 
of less stable multipolar order?  Is the purchase of 
increasingly complex naval arms in the region simply 
modernization or part of expansive maritime policies by 
Japan, South Korea, and the PRC?  To answer these 
questions, the concept of an arms race must first be 
examined and then applied to each state’s concept of 
maritime security.   
1. History of Naval Arms Races 
Strictly defined, an arms race can be seen as 
"literally a competitive building up of armaments between 
two actors in conflict.  The basic process in the arms race 
is the action-reaction pattern."111  In the maritime realm, 
throughout history there have been numerous arms races 
initiated by leaders, transformational technologies, and 
empire building.  A naval arms race between imperial 
Germany and the United Kingdom helped prompt World War I.  
The Washington and London Naval Conferences sought to 
prevent a recurrence and signaled to naval powers in Asia 
that they were not accorded the same level of respect of 
the European and American navies.  The treaties ultimately 
lapsed in 1936 in time for the naval building programs in 
Japan and the United States.  After World War II, the 
Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
countries--most notably the Union of Soviet Socialist 
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Republic and the United States—engaged in a tit-for-tat 
naval arms race, building submarines, carriers, cruisers, 
and aircraft to counter each other at sea. 
2. Post-Cold War Fears 
As stated before, the conclusion of the Cold War 
brought about fears of a maritime power vacuum in East 
Asian waters.  The former navy of the Soviet Union withdrew 
to Vladivostok and other ports in the Russian Far East, 
while the United States Navy and its allies remained on 
station filling the potential void.  Barring a major shift 
in American foreign policy, the United States Navy will 
continue plying the waters of East Asia.  The economic 
stake America has in the globalizing and integrating 
economies of Asia inhibits withdrawing its military 
presence.  More than anything, the United States maintained 
its presence to sustain the status quo. 
What has emerged in East Asia reflects the efforts of 
are those countries fortunate enough to convert economic 
prosperity into the foreign policy instruments of maritime 
power—namely, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the PRC.  
In building increasingly powerful fleets to ensure the 
security of their maritime interests, these three countries 
find themselves focused on various internal and external 
forces that shape their decisions in building and training 
their fleets.  The internal aspect lies between the three 
nations and their respective immediate security threats, 
but the external facets are manifold.  For example, China 
must not only deal with ASEAN navies, but also the Indian 
"Look East” policy, which has recently gained a partial 
maritime patron in the United States Navy. 
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The concept of a naval arms race as defined in the 
21st century does not come with the grand apocalyptic sweep 
of Jutland, Midway, or the Russo-American battle over the 
Atlantic that never materialized.  Instead, the nations of 
East Asia work within their means and purchase weapon 
systems and initiate training programs based on territorial  
defense and preexisting conflict.  One has only to look so 
far as the systems being developed to understand the 
limited scope of naval modernization in East Asia.  
However, the internal and external forces driving the 
development and modernization of East Asian navies must 
first be thoroughly examined.  
The underlying dilemma in a maritime arms race in East 
Asia stems from balance the three states seek in their 
domestic and foreign policy.  Will China, Japan, or South 
Korea use a naval buildup as means to exert national power 
over the broader swath of the Asian sea lanes, or will 
economics torpedo fleeting hopes of grand Asian armada?  To 
answer this question the pattern of acquisitions and 
employment may be considered.  Moreover, on a higher level, 
each nation must predict the reaction of the others to 
rising competition.  For example, does Beijing really want 
to give the PLAN an offensive power projection force beyond 
Chinese waters?  Additionally, what is the true direction 
of reforms in the Japanese MSDF's overall doctrine shift?  
Additionally, how realistic is it to expect the ROKN to 
operate at extended distances?  Lastly, what domestic ends 
do naval power serve, especially in the two democracies of 
East Asia?           
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B. ARMS PROLIFERATION IN FLEETS 
The end of the Cold War signaled a shift not just in 
international relations, but also in maritime security.  
The nations maintaining fleets in support of superpower 
allies and those with fleets for limited, fleet-in-being 
territorial defense look outward to a new reality.  The 
remaining maritime superpower, the United States, 
reinforced the shift from massive fleet on fleet 
engagements voiced in its earlier Maritime Strategy to a 
littoral strategy in …From the Sea to suit to the new 
reality.112  From the Sea has since been replaced with the 
United States Navy’s new vision Sea Power 21, which takes 
further into account the new global war on terrorism and 
the Bush Administration’s preemptive doctrine.  
The question of naval arms race emerging from this new 
security paradigm presents a new set of questions as to why 
East Asian navies continue purchasing increasingly complex 
weapon systems.  Moreover, along with the material advances 
at sea observers must also take into account the quality of 
infrastructure and training supporting the forces involved.  
With this in mind, the East Asian navies need to be 
evaluated with a full lens of understanding.  Arms 
observers will decry the transfer of numerous weapons 
systems to and from various navies without fully realizing  
the true impact.  As one naval commentator points out in 
Maritime Forces in Global Security, “For example, 
differences in infrastructure, at sea time, training, 
strategy, and tactics give…very different combat potential 
                      
112 Ann Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon, eds.  Maritime Forces in 
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[to] the Russian, Iranian, and Algerian navies.” 113  
Moreover, this equipment is profoundly affected by its 
operating environment.114  The Kilo diesel submarine again 
serves as an example.  Designed for operations in the 
Soviet navy in the northern latitudes, the Kilo experienced 
serious problems with higher seawater temperatures, 
increased corrosion, and battery problems.            
Beyond the tactical-operational level of arms 
proliferation, the question of naval arm proliferation may 
be evaluated on whether navies acquire systems and embark 
on programs with goals above the dictates of self-defense.  
To crystallize this notion, one has only to look so far as 
the long-term building programs of each navy.  The trend 
running through all three maritime forces--the PLAN, MSDF, 
and ROKN--is that none is building combatants above the 
size of destroyer.  Japan recently launched a helicopter 
carrier/troop transport ship, but it is not capable of 
fixed wing operations, nor does Japan possess vertical 
short take off and landing (VSTOL) capability, as with 
aircraft like the Harrier jump jet.  As such, Japan is not 
vying to expand its capability beyond that of robust self-
defense.  Some may say that by operating with the US and in 
some cases as part of US carrier battle groups tie Japan 
and South Korea into operating combatants of limited size 
and scope, however, the new realities of naval construction 
and extended logistics make platforms destroyer-sized and 
below the most cost-effective and versatile assets a modern 
navy can possess.   
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A simple reality in the shifting of naval strategy and 
thought is the fact that smaller platforms now outperform 
their traditionally defined roles.  States can now build 
navies almost entirely composed of frigate and destroyer-
sized ships to protect extended coastlines.  Submarines, 
especially in the confined waters of East Asia, increase in 
value for their stealth and economy in force.              
C. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Undoubtedly, the Chinese are taking great leaps toward 
a more maricentric orientation.  The emergence of their 
economy and concentration of production and wealth on the 
Chinese coast is a shift back to the times of old.  
However, to support this buildup on the coastline, they 
have largely invested only in destroyer and frigate-sized 
combatants.  Even with the inclusion of the newly acquired 
Sovremenny, destroyers from Russia, their naval strategy 
for power projection out to the second island chain is 
incomplete for without air cover and, more importantly, 
logistical support.  The acquisition of Kilo submarines 
from Russia also presents a new dimension, but ultimately 
falls prey to problems of logistics and maintenance.   
Both naval weapon systems, Sovremenny and Kilo, are 
short-term solutions to a pressing long-term problem: 
Taiwan.  They are counters to specific threats of the de 
facto U.S. support for Taiwan.  They are not viable, 
however, in a joint operating arena with air and submarine 
power surpassing the capabilities of the PLAN, PLANAF, and 
PLAAF.  In the end, if conflict does come to the waters off 
of Taiwan in the East Sea Fleet’s area of operations, 
Chinese capability to deter Taiwanese and other forces may 
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be held at arm's length or destroyed by a coordinated 
Taiwanese naval/air force and U.S. naval airpower. 115  
Future purchases of Russian arms, newer indigenously 
produced vessels, and operating patterns outside of home 
waters point to more worrisome trend in China's maritime 
power.  Several PLAN submarines were reported east of 
Taiwan in 2002.116  The pending purchase of eight additional 
Kilo class submarines of the Project 636 variety, with an 
option to purchase three more, leads to increased concern 
in Taiwan of a submarine blockade, especially when the 
armaments of these new Kilos is taken into account.  The 
June 2002 Sino-Russian submarine contract called for up to 
eleven boats armed with 3M45E Klub-S subsonic anti-ship 
missiles, which would upgrade the PLAN's anti -surface 
mission capability.117  Contract disputes have delayed the 
addition of another two Sovremenny destroyers from the 
original delivery dates of 2005 and 2006 to the PLAN. 118  
China signed the contract on May 10, 2002 after Russian 
internal strife over which yard, Severnaya or the Baltic 
Shipyard, would build the pair. 119  Intriguingly, very few 
modifications have been made to this 35-year old design 
other than new helicopter facilities on the ordered Chinese 
pair.120  
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It may also be said that the instruments of sea 
control have changed with the end of the Cold War and the 
purported Revolution in Military Affairs in progress.  The 
Chinese, with their limited funding for naval expansion, 
might use conventional asymmetries, like submarines, in 
future conflict, combined with the unconventional.  After 
all, they do not seek a Jutland with an enemy fleet.  
Instead, in the short to mid-term, the PRC and in turn the 
PLAN will not act in the presence of an overwhelmingly 
superior enemy.  
The much-ballyhooed idea of a Chinese carrier is 
intriguing but a long-term concept.  Carrier hulls have 
been purchased from Australia and Russia, but none are 
projected to be placed in service.  The Chinese may have 
acquired them for research, but Beijing appears to regard 
the development of a carrier as prohibitively expensive.  
Moreover, the Japanese Office of Developmental Assistance 
linked loans to China to not developing a carrier.  In 
addition, operation of a carrier requires years of training 
both for pilots and for crew operating the vessel.  With 
all of these factors taken into account, a Chinese carrier 
is a long-term prospect, not unlike the development of the 
entire armed service.    
What is particularly daunting about the PLAN is not 
its current abilities, but its future.  Caution must be 
exercised, and the PLAN's development of capability must be 
closely watched.  Indicators of success for the PLAN will 
come in the form of capabilities such as C4ISR (Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Over the Horizon 
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Targeting (OTH-T), anti-air, anti-submarine, and, most 
importantly, logistics.  In the near term, the PLAN will 
concentrate on consolidation and proficiency in new, more 
efficient use of naval combat force.  Additionally, Chinese 
interest in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) at sea 
has limited but worrisome implications.  Almost exclusively 
written and theorized on by elites with the Chinese defense 
sector, the RMA has long-term implications to augment the 
capability of the PLAN and Chinese foreign policy goals, as 
Michael Pillsbury points out in "Chinese Views of Future 
Warfare."121  If the Chinese RMA were to succeed, it would 
have serious ramifications on how the ROKN, JMSDF, and USN 
operate in East Asia for its disruptive capabilities.  
These developments, coupled with extended deployments into 
the South China Sea and beyond, should serve as notice to 
the world of China's maritime achievement.  However, for 
the time being, China is a nation with tremendous potential 
maritime and naval power but still ranks behind Japan.  
D. JAPAN 
The mission of the MSDF may not change for the 
immediately foreseeable future, even as Japan incrementally 
adjusts and reviews its defense posture.  By all accounts, 
Japan is not embarking on an offensive oriented naval 
building initiative.  Instead, Japan is continuing towards 
extending its reach in the War on Terrorism and for 
humanitarian intensions.  Japan is still the most capable 
naval and maritime power in East Asia and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future, despite economic stagnation.  
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American patronage and extended maritime power preserves 
Japan's position. 
Naval construction in Japan currently proceeds in 
three main combatant categories: submarines, destroyers, 
and guided missile patrol craft.  Maintaining a force level 
of 16 diesel submarines, Japan intends to continue slowly 
replacing older boats with the 3,600-ton Oyashio-class. 122  
Like the ROKN, Japan is actively looking into air 
independent propulsion (AIP) for its submarines by using 
its Harushio-class submarine the Asashio as a test platform 
for this new technology since 2000.  The destroyer force 
also is undergoing gradual modernization with the 
commissioning of two Murasame and three Takinami-class 
vessels this year.  Japan is actively planning two 10,000 
ton (a size approaching that of cruiser) successors to the 
Kongo-class destroyers with the first slated for 
commissioning in 2007.   
Japan is continuing to build vessels of the submarine, 
patrol craft, and destroyer caliber to defend its 
interests.  The most interesting development of late is the 
MSDF placing into commission a light helicopter carrier  of 
the Osumi-class, ostensibly to assist in humanitarian 
operations as well as anti-submarine warfare, a mission 
growing with the expansion of the PLAN's submarine force.  
The MSDF remains a strong force for peace and stability in 
East Asia.  Technologically advanced and highly 
professionalized, it possesses the command and control, 
anti-air, anti-submarine, and logistics capabilities the 
PLAN and ROKN ultimately covet.   
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E. REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
South Korea’s striving for peace on the peninsula 
motivates its cautious naval development.  The KDX series 
of frigate/destroyers, under development and entering 
service, and being produced in three sets of three in 
increasing order of complexity.  In addition, the ROK is 
producing three Howaldtswerke Type 214 AIP subm arines under 
contract.123  The Hyundai yard at Ulsan took delivery of 
$590 million worth of equipment to produce the Type 214 
intended to augment the ROKN’s Type 209/1200 submarines 
built under contract at Daewoo in Okpo. 124     
The ROKN possesses an expanding force of indigenously 
produced destroyer and frigate sized ships capable of blue 
water operation, namely the Hyundai and Daewoo produced KDX 
series.  Three ships of three different tonnages and 
weapons suites: KDX-I displacing 3,855 tons, KDX-II 
displacing 5,000 tons, and KDX-III displacing 7,000 tons. 125   
KDX-I and KDX-II classes already have units in 
commission and in pre-commissioning.  KDX-III is in the 
final design process at Hyundai Shipyard, Ulsan. 126  A 
heated competition between Lockheed Martin and Thales over 
the combat systems suite of the KDX-III led to the Aegis 
system being selected for its interoperability with the 
United States Navy and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in 
the likelihood of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) scenario, 
                      123 A. D. Baker, III, “World Navies in Review,” United States Naval 
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still a contentious issue in inter-Korean and Sino-Korean 
politics. 
Because of its position, and dilemmas associated with 
the reunification with North Korea, the ROKN has a less 
prominent role in power projection and reserves the defense 
of extended SLOCs for wartime.  Admirably South Korea is 
looking outward towards a long-term goal.  The grand vision 
of the ROKN is constrained ultimately by the fiscal 
realities of reunification and the economic straits of 
South Korea.  The Asian financial crisis of 1997 set the 
ROKN back in terms of development and has tempered its 
acquisition plans. 
F. OVERALL DIRECTION OF AN EAST ASIAN MARITIME NAVAL ARMS 
East Asian navies overwhelmingly continue to procure 
cost effective vessels, especially destroyers and 
submarines.  Augmented with land-based patrol, fighter, and 
strike aircraft, these navies rely almost exclusively upon 
these ships to carry out the mission in the immediate 
vicinity of their countries.  Compared with previous naval 
arms races, the East Asian navies are not building  vessels 
at high volume rate with appreciable power projection 
capabilities.  Instead, they are procuring vessels to meet 
limited goals and in most cases are not building ships to 
counter one another, a classic behavior in arms races. 
The United States must continue to engage the region’s 
navies given the importance of East Asia economically to 
America.  The procurement of naval arms by Japan and South 
Korea is seen in favorable terms because the systems are 
indigenously produced and of American origin.  The slow 
expansion outward of the JMSDF and ROKN alleviates need for 
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an enlarged American presence in the region and allows the 
United States to concentrate on new initiatives in the 
region and elsewhere in the War on Terrorism.  China’s 
naval growth must be watched closely and carefully.  The 
acquisition of Russian systems changes the balance of power 
of East Asian maritime security, but not inexorably.  
China’s domestic production, like Japan and the ROK, is 
incomplete.  While China produces a massive amount of 
commercial tonnage, it still lags behind in the fine 
systems-level component of warship fabrication.  Moreover, 
the PRC’s production of warships remains restricted by 
domestic and international factors.   
East Asia’s navies continue increasing in size, but 
retain a limited scope of activities.  The low rate of 
warship production and types of vessels under construction 
are not indicative of a rising arms race.  On the contrary, 
East Asia’s navies complement each other in their ability 
to protect the SLOCs of the region by the regional 
operations and restraint in further construction.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. MARITIME SECURITY PROSPECTS IN EAST ASIA 
The state of maritime security in East Asia is stable; 
however, several events or development could inexorably 
shift the balance toward greater conflict.  First, the 
deterioration or enhancement of the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula could alter the framework of the maritime 
security structure.  Next, conflict over Taiwan and the 
roles the ROKN and MSDF play in the clash would signal a 
more ominous shift.  Lastly, a conflict in the South China 
Sea would have the direst of consequences for the entire 
region in disruption of the freedom of navigation through 
the region and flow of resources.  
A war on the Korean Peninsula would influence Japan 
and South Korea the most directly in the maritime realm.  
American complicity in the beginning of such a conflict 
would further complicate matters.  However, the upside of 
Korean reunification could mean the reemergence of the 
former Hermit Kingdom's maritime influence.  After the 
potential economic and governmental hangover of 
unification, Korea must determine its course in the future 
of East Asian maritime affairs.   
1. Future Conflict 
Given the huge economic ramifications of protracted 
maritime conflict in East Asia and the potential for 
serious disruptions in energy supplies to this dependent 
region, conflict will be preemptive and abrupt.  
Geopolitically, this is the most viable solution for the 
three maritime powers in case of irresolvable conflict in 
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the region.  The Bush Doctrine enunciated at West Point 127 
spoke to preemptive action by the preeminent power in the 
Asian-Pacific region.     
This trend in diplomacy will drive the maritime powers 
to this end.  Some factors, such as the Korean 
reconciliation process, hold nations in place with the 
hopes of peacefully resolving issues.  Others, like the 
potential conflict between Taiwan and the mainland, merely 
need the tinder of another ill-advised ROC presidential 
visit or declaration of independence to spark conflict on a 
greater scale.  If the conditions ripen for conflict over 
Taiwan, the war at sea most likely could come quicker than 
the United States might like, followed by negotiations to 
sue for peace.  Whereas time is against the PRC regarding 
the situation on Taiwan, time would not be in the 
mainland’s favor against the ROC if aided by a de facto 
ally. 
2. Prospects for Maritime Cooperation 
Like overall security cooperation in East Asia, 
maritime security cooperation has proceeded at a slow pace.  
Though various non-governmental forums exist on this 
subject, little has been done to solidify the maritime 
security of East Asia amongst the three primary naval 
powers.  One possibility for enhancing the security of the 
region’s nautical regime lies in preexisting bilateral 
organizations.  The Sino-American Military Maritime 
Cooperation Agreement may be just one example of a possible 
framework.  However, for a consolidated vision of maritime 
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security to succeed all naval powers in East Asia, 
including the United States, must be made equal partners.  
The Chinese, for example, will not accept a maritime 
security organization with overwhelming U.S. or Japanese 
direction.  Conversely, the Japanese and Koreans will may 
not accept overwhelming Chinese influence just as well.  
3. U.S. Interests in the Maritime Security in East 
Asia 
The United States interest in the region is 
exacerbated by both the tyranny of distance and long-
standing foreign policy goal of preventing a single power 
from dominating the region.  The Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) made strides towards ameliorating this by ordering 
the Chief of Naval Operations to look into basing nearly an 
additional battle group's worth of assets in the Western 
Pacific, ostensibly in Guam.  This part of the QDR 
seemingly focused on supporting the strategy of deterring 
forward.  As a forward deterrent force the U.S. Navy will 
be able to prevent aggression and coercion towards American 
forces and allies by tailoring forces to the requirements 
of East Asia.128 
This is not to say that the United States needs to 
place more forces in the region.  The QDR’s guidance may 
signal a shift southward to protect the vital SLOCs for 
East Asian expansion.  Instead, forces in the Pacific 
should be shifted accordingly and provided increased 
funding priority.  With exception to Central Command’s 
heavy burdens in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the War 
on Terrorism, the Pacific Command now more than ever 
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deserves greater priority in funding and attention.  The 
lack of a regional security framework and rising great 
powers in the form of Japan and China dictate this need. 
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APPENDIX A.  PLAN FLEET AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  75 
APPENDIX B.  JMSDF DEFENSE DISTRICTS 
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APPENDIX C.  MARITIME OIL FLOWS TO EAST ASIA 
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APPENDIX D.  THE TOK DO/TAKESHIMA DISPUTE 
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APPENDIX E.  THE SENKAKU/DIAOYOU ISLANDS DISPUTE 
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APPENDIX F.  PRC CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
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APPENDIX G.  CLAIMS AND OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE 
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